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Ethical Standards to Guide the Development of Obesity Policies and 
Programs
Comment on “Ethical Agreement and Disagreement about Obesity Prevention Policy in the United States”
The article by Barnhill and King on ethical agreement and disagreement about obesity prevention policy in the US (1) offers an insightful analysis of the underlying sources 
of confusion, tension and conflict that arise in setting ethical 
standards for obesity policies and programs.  The issue of obesity 
prevention is timely and salient, and it is important to conduct 
careful normative analyses of such policies as they raise distinct 
ethical concerns relative to other public health prevention 
goals. Unlike the ethically acceptable restrictions to reduce and 
prevent cigarette smoking, for example, the justification for 
obesity prevention policies cannot rest squarely on the harm 
principle, i.e., the need to prevent adverse health consequences 
to others exposed to second-hand smoke. Although some 
have argued that obesity is “contagious” (2) because exposure 
promotes acceptance of the empirical norm of being overweight, 
the various policies now under consideration are more clearly 
analogous to motorcycle helmet laws, where the primary goal is 
to prevent harms that individuals inflict on themselves. Barnhill 
and King argue that the issues raised by obesity prevention 
policies are most commonly cast, and can best be understood, 
in terms of achieving an ethically appropriate balance between 
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Abstract
The recent report by Barnhill and King about obesity prevention 
policy raises important issues for discussion and analysis.  In 
response, this article raises four points for further consideration. 
First, a distinction between equality and justice needs to be made 
and consistently maintained. Second, different theories of justice 
highlight one additional important source of disagreement about 
the ethical propriety of the proposed obesity prevention policies. 
Third, another point of contention arises with respect to different 
understandings of the principle of respect for autonomy due to its 
often-mistaken equation with simple, unfettered freedom. Finally, 
based on a more robust definition of autonomy, the key issues in 
obesity prevention policies can be suitably re-framed in terms of 
whether they advance just social conditions that enable people to 
realize human capabilities to the fullest extent possible.
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the principles of autonomy and equality.  In this Commentary, I 
raise several additional points for further consideration. 
As Barnhill and King state, a number of new policy proposals, 
such as taxes on sugary drinks and banning the sale of large 
sugary drinks, have generated significant public controversy. In 
their analysis, Barnhill and King make two main points. First, 
they indicate that disagreements may arise over the relative 
weight that should be given to the principles of autonomy versus 
equality. Second, they explain that each principle contains 
multiple dimensions, which can result in further disagreements. 
For example, in debates about taxes on soda pop, not only is 
the issue a matter of balancing autonomy and equality, but 
additional disagreements may also arise internal to the principle 
of equality itself, such as achieving equality in health versus 
equality in income.
In response, I would like to bring up four points. The first 
issue is one of clarification. In the article, the authors equate 
equality with fairness and justice, and thereafter, use the terms 
interchangeably.  The conflation of equality and justice, however, 
masks a critical distinction between inequality and inequity. 
Although the sheer existence of health disparities is widely 
invoked in popular calls for justice, differences in health status 
are due to many causes, only some of which can be considered 
unjust. Genetic diseases, for example, result in significant health 
disparities, but they are not within human power to control or 
the result of rectifiable social arrangements.  Sickle-cell anemia 
is more prevalent in African and African-American populations, 
and while it is tragic, its distribution is not a matter of the justice 
of social conditions. Thus, it might be more apt to locate the 
central issue in analyses of public health prevention policies in 
tensions between the principles of justice and autonomy.
The preceding reformulation is important because there 
are critical differences in theories of justice that are lost when 
justice is equated with equality. In terms of justice, the driving 
force behind contentious debates about the provision of 
healthcare services in America today can be more fruitfully 
cast in terms of disputes between egalitarian theories of justice 
versus meritocratic theories, or theories of moral desert. In 
theories of justice based on moral desert, people get what they 
deserve: good people are rewarded and bad people punished 
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(3,4). In light of these different theories of justice, one major 
source of disagreement lies in the degree to which individuals 
can and should be held morally accountable for their behavior. 
Differences in health status that are due to freely chosen behaviors 
may result in health inequalities, but they do not oblige society 
to act if they are indeed the result of the free and autonomous 
choices of the individual agent. From the perspective of moral 
desert, if someone gets sick or injured because they choose to 
engage in foolish and imprudent activities, then they are getting 
what they deserve and the result is not unjust. And there’s the 
rub. At the heart of disagreements about what to do about 
obesity is the degree to which citizens believe that individuals 
have the capacity to make free and autonomous choices about 
what and how much they ingest, or whether such choices are 
significantly determined by one’s position in the social structure, 
which leads to my third point. 
Another major point of confusion and disagreement stems 
from the use and meaning of the term autonomy.  Unfortunately, 
in popular accounts, autonomy is frequently equated with 
individual freedom, in particular, in the sense of freedom from 
external constraint, or what Berlin describes as negative liberty 
(5). As originally articulated by Mill (6), this view of liberty 
is deeply entrenched in American culture, and provides the 
bedrock foundation for claims that constraints on individual 
freedom are ethically warranted only when such actions cause 
harm to others. Policies that limit individual freedom for the 
benefit of the individual herself are quickly tarred with charges 
of paternalism (7). Before the effects of second-hand smoke 
were scientifically confirmed, policies to restrict smoking 
faced difficult challenges in the court of public opinion, but 
this sentiment quickly changed when proof of harm to others 
emerged. Obesity prevention policies now face a similar uphill 
battle, but the case for harm to others here rests on shaky grounds, 
with little prospect for solid scientific evidence emerging in the 
foreseeable future. Where public health advocates have gone 
wrong is in allowing the terms of the debate to be dictated by the 
facile equation of autonomy with negative liberty. 
Following Dworkin, Frankfurt and others (8–10), freedom 
can be thought of the absence of restrictions to act on first-
order desires, i.e., whatever urges one happens to feel in the 
moment.  In contrast, autonomy is the ability to formulate and 
act on the second-order desires; it is the capacity to choose to 
act on felt first-order desires or not, based on values about the 
kind of person one aims to be and the life plans one seeks to 
achieve.  Based on this definition, mounting evidence indicates 
that the exercise of autonomy is strongly associated with positive 
health; Wilkinson in fact argues that it is the most powerful 
factor in determining individual health status (11,12). From 
this perspective, debates about whether soda pop taxes infringe 
on autonomy are a red herring, irrelevant to larger questions of 
reducing health disparities and improving the overall health of 
the population. The problem is not that people have too much 
autonomy, it is that they do not have enough, or more precisely, 
that its current distribution is grossly unfair, in the ethically 
relevant meaning of the principle.
Extending the point, Sen has mounted trenchant critiques of 
the Rawlsian principle of fair equality of opportunity, arguing 
that such opportunities are cruel fictions when many options 
are foreclosed or delimited by the effects of poverty, inferior 
education, racism, disproportionate exposure to environmental 
toxins (e.g., cockroaches as asthma triggers, lead paint in low 
income housing, etc.), and other similar accidents of birth (13).1 
As a result, socially identifiable segments of the population 
cannot exercise the same degree of autonomy as those who 
occupy other more affluent positions in the social structure. In 
contrast, under the conditions of what Sen terms “substantive 
freedom”, socially valued capabilities need to be fairly distributed 
first in order for people to exercise autonomy as it relates to the 
more important issue of the capacity to pursue worthwhile, 
rewarding and respect worthy life plans. In this light, it is clear 
that those segments of the population that can exercise the 
greatest degree of autonomy choose not to smoke, to watch their 
weight, stay physically active, and so on, whether or not the level 
of taxes on soda pop is raised or large sizes banned.
In conclusion, the primary ethical concern in analyzing various 
obesity prevention policies should be their impact on the least 
well-off segments of society. This concern must be seen in the 
context of questions about whether the obesity epidemic is 
destined to follow in the footsteps of smoking epidemic, where 
virtually identical policies have aggravated health disparities and 
further stigmatized the afflicted. Taxing soda pop and banning 
the sale of larger (and hence cheaper) soda pop containers are 
inherently regressive, and rationalizations that these policies 
are being enacted in the name of justice deeply flawed and 
misleading. Telling poor people what they can or cannot buy 
with food stamps is insulting, another assault on the dignity 
of those who have already suffered most. While many have 
lamented the priority given to the right over the good in the 
modern era (14), the high level of interest in Sen’s capabilities 
approach and Dworkin’s expositions of luck egalitarianism 
suggest that the field of public health recognizes that “health” is 
an inherently value-laden term (15–20), and hence, it is time to 
make the normative issues of justice and autonomy more central 
and explicit to achieving the goals of public health. As Dawson 
and Verweij note (21), the shift could “open up a rich discussion 
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